Washington State Supreme Court reverses Division II in part and holds that failure to meet conditions to terminate a foreclosure sale and further appeal the trial court’s ruling constitutes a waiver of the right to challenge the foreclosure sale, but not other post-sale relief in Frizzell v. Murray, No. 87927-3.

Background and Analysis

Despite her relatively low income of $1600 a month, and despite a learning disability and dementia, Tamara Frizzell obtained from lenders a $100,000 loan secured by the $250,000 home she inherited from her late husband.  She had initially sought a $20,000 loan to pay bills, but the lenders, Barbara and Gregory Murray, convinced Frizzell that she could get a better interest rate on a $100,000 loan.  The Murrays explained that they would only loan money for business purposes, so Frizzell’s live-in friend convinced her that the two of them could launch a wheelchair and scooter business with the 40-50 wheelchairs and scooters he had stored on Frizzell’s property.  Without any business background, business plan, or any other indicia that a wheelchair/scooter business would work, Frizzell received the $100,000 loan, minus $12,000 that the Murrays retained for fees. 
Continue Reading State Supreme Court Curtails Post-Foreclosure Sale Invalidation, but Permits Other Relief

Last week the Washington Supreme Court extended a life preserver to plaintiffs who brought med mal claims against public hospitals between July 1, 2010 and December 27, 2012 without giving the hospitals 90-days presuit notice. The Court withdrew its earlier opinions in McDevitt v. Harborview and clarified that its ruling upholding the presuit notice requirement as to public hospitals would apply only prospectively. These substantive points aside, this decision also provides helpful guidance on two matters to judges and practitioners alike: (1) be precise about the scope of the holding, rule of law announced, or relief requested; and (2) don’t give up on motions for reconsideration just because they are rarely granted. More after the jump.
Continue Reading Public Hospital Med Mal Plaintiffs from the Last Three Years Can Breathe Easy

Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Engineers, Inc. [Wash. Sup. Ct. No. 86590-6]

A five justice majority in this case continued to develop the “independent duty doctrine” in Washington. That doctrine has superseded the “economic loss rule,” which previously limited recovery of economic damages to contract claims and recovery of non-economic damages to tort claims. According to the majority opinion, described in greater length below, a contracting party can have a duty in tort to another contracting party if and only if the duty is independent of the agreement. If the contract is unclear, then it must be interpreted by a trier of fact before dismissal based on the independent duty doctrine is proper. As explained by the four-justice dissent, this analysis is unnecessary to the independent duty doctrine, cannot be harmonized with the parties’ agreement, and is not supported by settled principles of contract law. Consistent with those legal principles, the dissent would limit the plaintiff to contract damages where, as here, the parties’ agreement encompasses the risk of harm that is claimed.
Continue Reading Washington Supreme Court Breaks New Ground with Independent Duty Doctrine

In State v. Monfort, a six justice majority of the Washington Supreme Court emphasized that prosecutors need only make a “subjective determination” about whether a defendant should be executed before filing the notice required to seek the death penalty at trial.  The Supreme Court criticized a trial court for “going beyond the question of whether the county prosecutor had his reasons” and striking a death penalty notice on the basis that the prosecutor’s investigation was inadequate.  Three justices concurred, agreeing that the death penalty notice should be reinstated, but argued that prosecutors must have an objectively reasonable basis for seeking the death penalty.


Continue Reading Washington Supreme Court Holds That Prosecutors May Seek The Death Penalty Without An Objectively Reasonable Basis For The Decision

From our colleague, Rita Latsinova:

The State Supreme Court upheld RCW 9.95.160, which permits the governor to cancel the parole granted by the Indeterminate Sentencing Review Board, in a due-process challenge by an inmate whose parole had been approved and release date set by the Board but abruptly cancelled by the governor, who also denied the inmate’s request for an in-person hearing.

In 1982 Terry Lain was convicted of assaulting a police officer and sentenced to a maximum of life imprisonment. The Board set his minimum sentence at 240 months. After denying parole three times, in 2010 the Board found Lain conditionally parolable. Lain submitted a release plan that would relocate him to Iowa, and the State of Iowa agreed to allow parole there. The Board ordered him paroled effective December 20, 2010.

The police officer whom Lain had assaulted lodged a complaint with “the Problem Solvers” at KOMO news. KOMO ran a story opposing parole. The local police guild also objected to the parole. The governor cancelled the parole, ordered the Department of Corrections not to release Lain, and remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings. The Board held a hearing and added 36 months to Lain’s minimum term. Lain filed a personal restraint petition.Continue Reading Washington Supreme Court Holds that Governor’s Cancellation of an Inmate’s Parole Does Not Violate Due Process

State of Washington v. Bao Dinh Dang [Wash. Sup. Ct. No. 87726-2]

The Washington Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion that held that persons acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity and granted conditional release under medical supervision may only have their conditional release terminated if the court determines they are dangerous.  Without a dangerousness finding, a court may not commit an acquitted person into a mental health facility solely on the basis that the person is not abiding by the terms and conditions of release.  This should be a welcome decision for mental health advocates seeking to erode the assumption that the mentally ill are inherently dangerous or violent.Continue Reading WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT REQUIRES INDIVIDUALS TO BE FOUND DANGEROUS BEFORE THEY CAN BE INVOLUNTARILY COMMITTED, EVEN IF THEY HAVE BEEN FOUND NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY

At issue in State vs. Byrd is whether a police officer violated federal and state privacy rights by searching a defendant’s purse incident to arrest after the defendant was secured in a police car and the purse was left on the ground outside the vehicle.  The Washington Supreme Court determined that the search did not violate either the United States or Washington Constitutions because the purse was part of the defendant’s person and therefore subject to warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.

Four justices dissented, arguing the search violated state constitutional protections.  Justice Gonzales concurred with the majority, but wrote separately to suggest the search was invalid because the officer lacked probable cause to make the arrest itself.
Continue Reading A Purse Is Part of a Person, Even When the Person is Locked in a Police Car and the Purse is Not

At its October 1, 2013 conference, the Washington Supreme granted review to four cases. We provide a summary of the issues presented in each case below.

State v. Owens
Supreme Court No. 88905-8
Court of Appeals No. 67867–1–I
PFR & Answer

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals properly reversed a conviction for First Degree

In Swinomish Indian Tribal Community v. Washington State Department of Ecology (PDF), the Washington Supreme Court determined that the state Department of Ecology (Ecology) overstepped its statutory authority by issuing an Amended Rule for the Skagit River which both established minimum water flow levels and set aside 27 reservations allowing users to draw on the water even if that use would force the river below that minimum flow level.


Continue Reading Washington Supreme Court Strikes Down Department of Ecology Reservations of Water Uses that Conflict with Minimum Water Flow Levels for the Skagit River System

At issue in State v. Dye (PDF) was whether a criminal defendant is denied a fair trial by allowing a developmentally disabled victim to testify with the assistance of a comfort dog.  Such trial management decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Based on the evidence presented to the trial court at a hearing on the special dispensation request, the Washington Supreme Court concluded, there was no abuse of discretion.
Continue Reading Anxious Trial Witness Permitted to Testify in Presence of Comfort Dog