A pending Minnesota Supreme Court case could reshape when out-of-state businesses can be sued in Minnesota based on contracts they never signed.

The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision to grant review in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lahn highlights an unsettled issue in personal jurisdiction: How far can courts extend their reach by binding non-signatories to forum selection clauses under the “closely related” doctrine?

At stake is not just the application of the doctrine in a single case, but the broader question of how expansively courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over out-of-state parties.

… Continue Reading When Is “Close” Close Enough? Minnesota Supreme Court to Review Scope of the “Closely Related” Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine

In a landmark decision affecting environmental insurance claims, the Oregon Supreme Court clarified the scope of the “contribution bar” under the Oregon Environmental Cleanup Assistance Act (OECAA). In Continental Casualty Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 373 Or. 389 (2025), the Court held that OECAA’s good-faith settlement bar applies only if a settlement resolves the…

In Davis v. Blast Properties, Inc., the Idaho Supreme Court clarified the standard trial courts should apply when deciding whether to grant a party leave to seek punitive damages. The Court held that trial courts are not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing, but trial courts are required to conduct “a careful examination of…

On January 29, 2024, the Idaho Supreme Court issued an opinion in Idaho State Athletic Commission v. Office of the Administrative Rules Coordinator. In the decision, the Court held that it does not have original jurisdiction to decide declaratory actions and affirmed the Legislature’s power to pre-approve rules promulgated by executive agencies.

The facts…

The Oregon Supreme Court has long held the legislature did not create a private right of action under the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act (ORS 746.230). Policyholders could bring a tort claim against their insurance company only if the insurer was subject to a standard of care independent of the insurance policy.[i]  But the Court’s mood changed last month in Moody v. Oregon Community Credit Union, 371 Or 772 (2023).

Moody’s facts are not complex.  Plaintiff Christine Moody’s husband, Troy, was accidentally shot and killed by a friend during a camping trip. Christine sought life insurance benefits, and the insurer denied Christine’s claim based on a policy exclusion for deaths caused by or resulting from the insured being “under the influence of any narcotic or other controlled substance.”  Troy evidently had marijuana in his system when he died.

Christine sued the insurer, alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of an implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and negligence. She sought both economic damages and emotional distress damages. In her negligence claim, Christine alleged the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act provided an independent standard of care outside the terms of the insurance contract.  She asserted the insurer violated several claims handling practices, such as failing “to pay the insurance benefits without conducting a reasonable investigation based on all available information” and “[n]ot attempting, in good faith, to promptly and equitably settle a claim in which the insurer’s liability has become reasonably clear.”  Christine further alleged that the insurer “knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care as a corporation engaged in the business of marketing and selling insurance, should have known, that one or more of its foregoing acts or omissions would create an unreasonable risk of harm to the beneficiaries of its insured, including [Christine].” Finally, because of the insurer’s negligence, she had suffered “the noneconomic loss of increased emotional distress and anxiety caused by having fewer financial resources to navigate the loss of a bread-winning spouse.”

Continue Reading The Mood Swings on Insurer Bad-Faith in Oregon: An Analysis of the Oregon Supreme Court Decision in Moody v. Oregon Community Credit Union

In Stratford v. Umpqua Bank, No. 100717-5 (Sept. 14, 2023) (slip op.), the Washington Supreme Court rejected the application of the “apex doctrine” in Washington. The apex doctrine has been adopted by some jurisdictions to shield high-level executives and officials from being deposed.  See, e.g., Robinett v. Opus Bank, No. C12-1755MJP, 2013 WL 5850873, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 30, 2013) (citing Salter v. Upjohn Co., 593 F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 1979)). In this case, Defendant Umpqua Bank argued that Washington should adopt a specific application of the apex doctrine, where a party seeking to depose a high-level officer must first show that: (1) the witness has unique, non-repetitive, firsthand knowledge of the facts at issue in the case, and (2) other less intrusive means of discovery, such as interrogatories and depositions of other employees, have been exhausted without success. Stratford, slip op. at 10.  The Washington Supreme Court rejected both this specific application and the doctrine more generally. 

Continue Reading Washington Supreme Court Unanimously Rejects the Apex Doctrine

We recently addressed the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in 616 Inc. v. Mae Properties, LLC, No. 49190 (Feb. 8, 2023), and specifically the essential elements of a lease. The decision also includes an important appellate practice point regarding the risks of pursuing a cross-appeal.

As a reminder, 616 Inc. appealed from the district…

On February 14, 2023, the Court released a unanimous decision in Treasure Valley Home Solutions, LLC v. Chason. This post will focus on the Court’s analysis of when a real estate transaction is a commercial transaction such that attorney’s fees can be awarded under Idaho Code § 12-120(3), as that analysis may create confusion for lower courts.

By way of background, Treasure Valley Home Solutions, LLC (“TVHS”), described as “an Idaho limited liability company that buys and sells properties,” submitted an offer to purchase Richard Chason’s personal residence. A dispute arose about whether the parties had entered a contract for the purchase, and the Court ultimately determined that they had not.

As the prevailing party, Chason requested his attorney’s fees under Section 12-120(3). That provision allows recovery of attorney’s fees in civil actions to recover on a contract relating to a “commercial transaction.” A commercial transaction is statutorily defined as “all transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes.”

The district court held that TVHS intended to purchase the property for commercial development, thus the contract at issue was a commercial transaction and Chason was entitled to his attorney’s fees under Section 12-120(3). On appeal, the Court disagreed, finding that “the record does not support the conclusion that the transaction itself was commercial” in part because “Chason submitted no evidence that the property was to be used for a commercial purpose.”
Continue Reading Idaho Supreme Court Update: Attorney’s Fees in Real Estate Litigation Under Idaho Code § 12-120(3)

Gavel-Canva (1)

On January 25, 2023, the Court issued a substitute opinion in Easterling v. HAL Pacific Properties. The decision, which was decided 3-2, provides insights into the Court’s views on statutory interpretation and construction. It also addresses actions that fall within Idaho’s catch-all statute of limitations, Idaho Code § 5-224.

The facts. The case concerns landlocked parcels owned by the Easterlings. The Easterlings sued an adjacent landowner, Hal Pacific Properties (“HAL”), claiming an easement by necessity over HAL’s property. The trial court mostly ruled in the Easterlings’ favor on summary judgment and at a bench trial. The trial court rejected HAL’s affirmative defense that the Easterlings’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations set forth in Idaho Code § 5-224, and held that the Easterlings were entitled to an easement by necessity over HAL’s property and set the location and width of the easement. HAL appealed.

The issues. The decision largely centered on whether the catch-all statute of limitations of Section 5-224 applies to an easement by necessity claim. Section 5-224 provides: “An action for relief not hereinbefore provided for must be commenced within four (4) years after the cause of action shall have accrued.” HAL argued that a plain reading of the statute requires its application to an easement by necessity claim, while the Easterlings argued the statute was inapplicable because the claim cannot be time barred. If Section 5-224 does apply to an easement by necessity claim, the issue turned to the accrual of the claim.

Continue Reading Idaho Supreme Court Update: Idaho’s catch-all statute of limitations revokes any common law rule that a claim cannot be time barred

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Welcome to the Stoel Rives Appellate Law blog, dedicated to providing those in appellate law practices regular updates on significant decisions from courts of appeal within our regions of practice. It is our goal to build out this blog to be a handy resource for both keeping up to date on new decisions and quickly locating information about past decisions.