In State v. Andre Luis Franklin, five State Supreme Court justices reversed a defendant’s convictions after concluding the trial court erred in excluding evidence to further the defendant’s “other suspect” defense.  The defendant, Franklin, was in pseudo-relationships with two different women, Hibbler and Fuerte, and the women had a history of jealousy with one another.  Soon after Franklin loaned some money to Fuerte, Fuerte began receiving emails from an unknown email address threatening to post compromising pictures of her online.  These emails were purportedly from Franklin.
Continue Reading State v. Franklin – State Supreme Court Divided Over Discretion

Under ER 404(b), evidence of prior bad acts is not admissible to show conformity with those acts.  In 2008, the Legislature carved out an exception to ER 404(b) by passing a bill that allowed evidence of prior sex crimes to be admitted in criminal sex cases.  But in 2012, the Washington Supreme Court held that this statute was unconstitutional.

Gower involves a bench trial that took place in 2009, after the Legislature’s ER 404(b) exception was in effect, but before it was held unconstitutional.  The State had charged Gower with a series of sex crimes relating to sexual contact with his minor step-daughter, SEH.  At trial, the State sought to admit the testimony of one of Gower’s other minor children, CM, and the trial court admitted CM’s testimony, stating that the evidence would have been inadmissible under ER 404(b), but was admissible under the statutory exception.  SEH also testified to her own experience at the hands of Gower.
Continue Reading State v. Gower: Anything is Reasonably Probable

In State v. Garcia, Jr., No. 88020-4, the State Supreme Court unanimously reversed the defendant’s first degree kidnapping and second-degree kidnapping convictions and remanded for a new trial of those convictions, but affirmed the defendant’s criminal trespass conviction.

The defendant, Phillip Garcia, Jr., believed he was involved in a car chase after hearing gun shots coming from other vehicles on a highway.  Garcia eventually abandoned his vehicle and ran to a gas station to seek help.  Upon learning the gas station was closed, Garcia broke into the gas station with a cinder block, but fled after hearing he triggered the station’s alarm.  Garcia then went to homes nearby, and ended up at the home where the victim was asleep.  Garcia entered the home through an unlocked door, then spoke with and remained with the victim for two hours before one of Garcia’s friends picked him up.

The State charged Garcia with first degree kidnapping based on his interactions with the victim, and first degree criminal trespass and burglary in the second degree for breaking into the gas station.  The State successfully excluded Garcia’s statements to the victim as hearsay, and also introduced a police report containing hearsay statements from Garcia’s previous burglary conviction.  A jury convicted Garcia of all three charges, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  Garcia appealed, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support the kidnapping charge and that the trial court’s above evidentiary rulings were erroneous.
Continue Reading State v. Garcia, Jr. – Not Enough Evidence for First Degree Kidnapping Conviction

In State v. Pena Fuentes, the State Supreme Court again condemned “the odious practice of eavesdropping on privileged communication between attorney and client” in criminal matters, as it had previously done in State v. Cory, 62 Wn.2d 371, 382 P.2d 1019 (1963).  Though the Cory court held that such misconduct is presumably prejudicial, in Pena Fuentes the court further held that the presumption is rebuttable if the State can prove the absence of prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt.
Continue Reading These Walls Shouldn’t Have Ears: State Supreme Court “Appalled” by the Need to Remind State that It May Not Eavesdrop on Private Conversations Between a Defendant and His/Her Counsel

Last week, the State Supreme Court affirmed a $12.75 million verdict (including $2,422,006 for future care and $10 million in noneconomic damages) against the City of Seattle in favor of former Seattle firefighter, Mark Jones, who was injured when he fell 15 feet down the “pole hole” in a fire station at 3 a.m. on December 23, 2000.  The case captured media attention when the press reported that post-trial surveillance videos showed Jones engaging in physical activities (e.g., playing horseshoes) the City alleged were inconsistent with his testimony at trial.   The trial court refused to grant a new trial.  The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion.  The City petitioned the Washington Supreme Court for review based on the surveillance video and the new evidence that Jones was an alcoholic and that his drinking interfered with his recovery.
Continue Reading Washington Supreme Court Affirms Firefighter’s $12.75 Million Verdict Against City of Seattle

State of Washington v. Bao Dinh Dang [Wash. Sup. Ct. No. 87726-2]

The Washington Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion that held that persons acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity and granted conditional release under medical supervision may only have their conditional release terminated if the court determines they are dangerous.  Without a dangerousness finding, a court may not commit an acquitted person into a mental health facility solely on the basis that the person is not abiding by the terms and conditions of release.  This should be a welcome decision for mental health advocates seeking to erode the assumption that the mentally ill are inherently dangerous or violent.Continue Reading WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT REQUIRES INDIVIDUALS TO BE FOUND DANGEROUS BEFORE THEY CAN BE INVOLUNTARILY COMMITTED, EVEN IF THEY HAVE BEEN FOUND NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY

In King County Public Hospital District No. 2 v. Wash. State Dep’t of Health, the Washington State Supreme Court recognized that administrative law judges have broad discretion to admit evidence in challenges to agency actions. Further, administrative law judges’ decisions on underlying agency actions are reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard, and the record supported the administrative law judge’s decision here that the Department of Health’s action was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

Background:Continue Reading Supreme Court Recognizes Broad Discretion of Administrative Law Judges to Admit Evidence, Even if Inconsistent with Past Agency Position