At issue in State vs. Byrd is whether a police officer violated federal and state privacy rights by searching a defendant’s purse incident to arrest after the defendant was secured in a police car and the purse was left on the ground outside the vehicle.  The Washington Supreme Court determined that the search did not violate either the United States or Washington Constitutions because the purse was part of the defendant’s person and therefore subject to warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.

Four justices dissented, arguing the search violated state constitutional protections.  Justice Gonzales concurred with the majority, but wrote separately to suggest the search was invalid because the officer lacked probable cause to make the arrest itself.
Continue Reading A Purse Is Part of a Person, Even When the Person is Locked in a Police Car and the Purse is Not

Yesterday the Washington Supreme Court recognized that taxpayers may immediately turn to courts for relief if a municipality ignores a request for a tax refund.  In CMS v. Lakewood, the Court held that the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine does not bar a suit for a tax refund if the taxing authority fails to respond to a refund request.  But in so holding, the Court clarified that exhaustion of administrative remedies remains a vital prerequisite to bringing suit, even if it is not a jurisdictional requirement. 
Continue Reading Washington Supreme Court on Tax Refund Suits: You Can’t Exhaust the Already Exhausted

In Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Sterling Savings Bank, the State Supreme Court unanimously held that a law firm paid by a title insurer to represent its insured owed a duty of care only to the law firm’s client—the insured—such that the non-client title insurer could not maintain a malpractice action against the attorney.
Continue Reading Wash. S. Ct. Clarifies that Law Firm Paid By Title Insurer to Defend Insured Not Subject to Title Insurer’s Malpractice Claim

At its October 1, 2013 conference, the Washington Supreme granted review to four cases. We provide a summary of the issues presented in each case below.

State v. Owens
Supreme Court No. 88905-8
Court of Appeals No. 67867–1–I
PFR & Answer

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals properly reversed a conviction for First Degree…

In Swinomish Indian Tribal Community v. Washington State Department of Ecology (PDF), the Washington Supreme Court determined that the state Department of Ecology (Ecology) overstepped its statutory authority by issuing an Amended Rule for the Skagit River which both established minimum water flow levels and set aside 27 reservations allowing users to draw on the water even if that use would force the river below that minimum flow level.


Continue Reading Washington Supreme Court Strikes Down Department of Ecology Reservations of Water Uses that Conflict with Minimum Water Flow Levels for the Skagit River System

At issue in State v. Dye (PDF) was whether a criminal defendant is denied a fair trial by allowing a developmentally disabled victim to testify with the assistance of a comfort dog.  Such trial management decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Based on the evidence presented to the trial court at a hearing on the special dispensation request, the Washington Supreme Court concluded, there was no abuse of discretion.
Continue Reading Anxious Trial Witness Permitted to Testify in Presence of Comfort Dog

In re Cross [Wash. Sup. Ct. No. 79761-7]

The Washington Supreme Court unanimously held in this opinion that a capital sentence can be predicated on an Alford plea.  The court explained that the “advantage” of entering an Alford plea in a capital case is to preserve the ability to argue in the penalty phase that the defendant’s actions were not premeditated.  But if entering an Alford plea does not allow a criminal defendant to avoid the death penalty, this so-called “advantage” hardly seems worthwhile.  Assuming defense attorneys agree with this assessment, Alford pleas may be both inadvisable and obsolete in capital cases.

Dayva Cross pleaded guilty to killing his wife and two of her daughters in 2001.  When Cross pled guilty, he did so by way of an Alford plea.  In such a plea, the accused technically does not acknowledge guilt but concedes that there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction.  A trial court judge can accept an Alford plea only if it is made voluntarily, competently, and with an understanding of the charge and the consequences of the plea and if the judge is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.

Critical to the Supreme Court’s analysis here, the trial court judge and the prosecutor painstakingly walked Cross through the elements of the crimes of which he was charged, his potential defenses, the rights he was relinquishing, and the punishment he faced.  The trial transcript showed that there was substantial evidence from which a jury could find premeditation and a common scheme and design.  The decision to plead guilty was tactical:  it preserved Cross’s ability to challenge these elements in the penalty phase.
Continue Reading Washington Supreme Court Holds Alford Plea Will Support a Death Penalty Verdict

In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of Benjamin B. Brockie, No. 86241-9 (Sept. 26, 2013) (en banc)

Benjamin Brockie was charged by information for, among other things, first degree robbery.  Brockie’s charging information indicated that “in the commission of an immediate flight therefrom, the defendant displayed what appeared to be a firearm or other deadly weapon.”  (emphasis added).  Critically, the charging information did not provide for the alternative means of committing first degree robbery–being armed with a deadly weapon.  The jury instructions, however, did include this alternative charge.  After Brockie’s trial, a jury convicted Brockie of, among other things two counts of first degree robbery.  In response to these convictions and his subsequent sentencing, Brockie filed a pro se motion to vacate his judgment and sentence.  Brockie’s motion argued that his conviction should be vacated because the jury was improperly instructed on the alternative means of committing first degree robbery, which was not contained in the charging information.  The superior court where Brockie filed his motion considered it a personal restraint petition–a form of collateral attack–and transferred the motion to the Court of Appeals.  The Court of Appeals then transferred the motion to the Washington Supreme Court.
Continue Reading No Prejudice Where Jury Received Charging Instructions Not Included in Original Charging Information

In Freeman v. State, the Washington Supreme Court rejected an attempt to block the lease of the two center lanes on I-90 to Sound Transit for light rail use. In so ruling, the Court held that WSDOT may lease highways financed with MVF monies where a plan exists to reimburse the MVF. It further held that WSDOT may enter into contracts to transfer highway property based on a contingent determination that such highway property will not be needed in the future.
Continue Reading I-90 Light Rail: Washington Supreme Court Says ‘All Aboard’

In State v. Lynch, the Washington State Supreme Court confirmed that a trial court’s inclusion of an affirmative defense instruction upon an unwilling defendant violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights in criminal prosecutions.
Continue Reading State Supreme Court Further Clarifies Distinction Between Casting Doubt on Elements of Charged Crimes and Affirmative Defenses

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Welcome to the Stoel Rives Appellate Law blog, dedicated to providing those in appellate law practices regular updates on significant decisions from courts of appeal within our regions of practice. It is our goal to build out this blog to be a handy resource for both keeping up to date on new decisions and quickly locating information about past decisions.