[Note:  This post was drafted by Labor and Employment Associate Karin Jones]

The Washington Supreme Court has significantly limited non-profit religious organizations’ immunity from employment discrimination claims brought under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”), RCW 49.60.  In Ockletree v. Franciscan Health System, the majority held that the exemption of non-profit religious organizations from the definition of “employer” in the WLAD is unconstitutional as applied in circumstances outside the scope of the organizations’ religious purposes.


Continue Reading Washington Supreme Court Holds That the WLAD Exemption for Non-Profit Religious Organizations is Unconstitutional as Applied to Certain Employees

In State v. Pena Fuentes, the State Supreme Court again condemned “the odious practice of eavesdropping on privileged communication between attorney and client” in criminal matters, as it had previously done in State v. Cory, 62 Wn.2d 371, 382 P.2d 1019 (1963).  Though the Cory court held that such misconduct is presumably prejudicial, in Pena Fuentes the court further held that the presumption is rebuttable if the State can prove the absence of prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt.
Continue Reading These Walls Shouldn’t Have Ears: State Supreme Court “Appalled” by the Need to Remind State that It May Not Eavesdrop on Private Conversations Between a Defendant and His/Her Counsel

[Note: This post was drafted by Litigation Partner Vanessa Power]

In Ellensburg Cement Products v. Kittitas County, et al., the Washington Supreme Court in an en banc ruling held that when a county provides a procedure for appealing a determination under the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA), the county must provide at least one open record hearing. The Court rejected Kittitas County’s argument that it could create its own proceeding, or interpret SEPA to provide no open record hearing.

An individual landowner, Homer Gibson, applied to Kittitas County to amend a prior Conditional Use Permit (CUP) that would allow him to conduct rock crushing in addition to gravel extraction on his land. Based on the original CUP, Gibson had previously received a gravel extraction permit from the Department of Natural Resources (DNR). In seeking to amend the CUP, Gibson suggested that the CUP was not limited to a 13.4 acre parcel, but applied to all 84 acres of his land. Gibson also submitted to Kittitas County an altered SEPA checklist that referred to a mining area greater than that permitted by DNR. Ellensburg Cement objected to Gibson’s application and noted the discrepancies.Continue Reading Statutory Interpretation Based On Plain Language Does Not Stop With “Literal, Word-By-Word Interpretation Bereft of Context”

[Note:  This post was drafted by Litigation Partner Jill Bowman]

The DCPA, chapter 61.34 RCW, is a remedial consumer protection statute intended to protect homeowners who, because they are in desperate circumstances, may be vulnerable to predatory schemes designed to deprive them of their equity interests.  The statute’s procedural safeguards are afforded to transactions involving

In State v. Kipp, a unanimous court reversed a defendant’s conviction because the trial court admitted a recording of a conversation that was protected by Washington’s privacy act.  A six Justice majority further ruled that Washington’s privacy act requires appellate courts to review de novo trial court decisions that a conversation was not private.  In a win for the amicus ACLU, the court emphasized that Washington’s statutory privacy protections trump law enforcement expediency.
Continue Reading Even Creeps Have a Right to Privacy: Appellate Courts Must Decide For Themselves Whether Conversations Admitted into a Criminal Trial Were Private or Not

In a 5-3 decision, the State Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on the use of Washington’s recreational immunity statute (former RCW 4.24.210) in Camicia v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co., No. 85583-8.

Plaintiff Susan Camicia was bicycling along the Interstate-90 trail, crossing over a portion of the trail located on Mercer Island, when she swerved to avoid the defendant construction company’s fence footing protruding onto the pathway.  Then Camicia immediately hit a wooden post on the trail, which the City of Mercer Island had placed there to prevent vehicles from using the trail, and was thrown from her bike.  Camicia suffered serious injuries and was paralyzed as a result of her fall.
Continue Reading Washington Supreme Court: Recreational Use Immunity is in the Eye of the Landowner

Roughly three years ago, the Washington Supreme Court took a bold step toward eliminating appeals to racial bias in criminal trials.  In State v. Monday, the Court reversed a first-degree murder conviction supported by videotape evidence of the charged crime and an apparent confession by the defendant because the prosecutor tainted the proceeding by impermissibly injecting race into the trial.  Specifically, the prosecutor argued that African-American witnesses had adhered to an anti-snitch code and mimicked some African-American witnesses’ pronunciation of the word “police.”  Monday was remarkable because the Court announced a rule putting the burden on the State – not the defendant – to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a prosecutor’s appeal to racial bias (whether subtle or direct) does not affect the jury’s verdict.    

Last week, the Supreme Court significantly limited the reach of Monday.  In the Personal Restraint Petition of Gentry, the Court ruled that the burden-shifting framework articulated in Monday does not apply retroactively to collateral attacks on criminal convictions.


Continue Reading Wash. S. Ct.: Monday Is Not A Retroactive, “Watershed” Rule Of Criminal Procedure

In In Re Personal Restraint of Stockwell, the Supreme Court unanimously (7 judges, with 2 concurring) determined that an involuntary guilty plea may only be overturned on collateral attack if the petitioner shows actual and substantial prejudice from the circumstances surrounding the plea.  This decision is the latest in the Court’s self-described “course correction” towards a more stringent standard for granting relief after convictions have been finalized.  While concurring, Justice Gordon McCloud, joined by Justice Stephens, wrote separately to complain that the majority defined too stringently the prejudice required to prevail on personal restraint petition
Continue Reading Does the Right to Counsel for Personal Restraint Petitions Mean Anything?

A five-Justice majority of the Washington Supreme Court ruled in Youngs v. PeaceHealth (No. 87811-1) that a corporate healthcare provider’s defense counsel may communicate ex parte with the plaintiff’s treating physician if – and only if – the communication is for the purpose of providing legal advice, the physician has direct knowledge of the events

Schroeder v. Wieghall

When Jaryd Schroeder was nine-years old, he sought treatment from Dr. Steven Weighall and Columbia Basin Imaging.  During this treatment, he received an MRI, which Weighall reviewed and concluded was normal.  Nearly eight years later, at the age of 17, Schroeder underwent another MRI.  This MRI revealed that Schroeder suffered from an Arnold Chiari Type I Malformation.  The radiologist reviewing the second MRI concluded that the condition had been present to the same extent at the time of Schroeder’s first MRI.

Subsequently, the day before his 19th birthday, Schroeder filed a medical malpractice action against Weighall, Columbia Basin Imaging, PC, and a third party (who was dismissed by stipulation).  In response, Weighall argued that the action was time barred by the applicable statute of limitations and subject to the minority-tolling exemption codified at RCW 4.16.190(2).  The trial court agreed with Weighall and dismissed Schroeder’s action.  Schroeder then appealed directly to the Washington Supreme Court, arguing that RCW 4.16.190(2) violated article I, section 10 and article I, section 12 of the Washington State Constitution.

The Washington Supreme Court reversed.Continue Reading Toll This: Wash. S. Ct. Holds Tolling Exemption In Med Mal Cases Unconstitutional