[Note:  This post was drafted by Labor and Employment Associate Karin Jones]

The Washington Supreme Court has significantly limited non-profit religious organizations’ immunity from employment discrimination claims brought under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”), RCW 49.60.  In Ockletree v. Franciscan Health System, the majority held that the exemption of non-profit religious organizations from the definition of “employer” in the WLAD is unconstitutional as applied in circumstances outside the scope of the organizations’ religious purposes.


Continue Reading Washington Supreme Court Holds That the WLAD Exemption for Non-Profit Religious Organizations is Unconstitutional as Applied to Certain Employees

In a 5-3 decision, the State Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on the use of Washington’s recreational immunity statute (former RCW 4.24.210) in Camicia v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co., No. 85583-8.

Plaintiff Susan Camicia was bicycling along the Interstate-90 trail, crossing over a portion of the trail located on Mercer Island, when she swerved to avoid the defendant construction company’s fence footing protruding onto the pathway.  Then Camicia immediately hit a wooden post on the trail, which the City of Mercer Island had placed there to prevent vehicles from using the trail, and was thrown from her bike.  Camicia suffered serious injuries and was paralyzed as a result of her fall.
Continue Reading Washington Supreme Court: Recreational Use Immunity is in the Eye of the Landowner

Roughly three years ago, the Washington Supreme Court took a bold step toward eliminating appeals to racial bias in criminal trials.  In State v. Monday, the Court reversed a first-degree murder conviction supported by videotape evidence of the charged crime and an apparent confession by the defendant because the prosecutor tainted the proceeding by impermissibly injecting race into the trial.  Specifically, the prosecutor argued that African-American witnesses had adhered to an anti-snitch code and mimicked some African-American witnesses’ pronunciation of the word “police.”  Monday was remarkable because the Court announced a rule putting the burden on the State – not the defendant – to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a prosecutor’s appeal to racial bias (whether subtle or direct) does not affect the jury’s verdict.    

Last week, the Supreme Court significantly limited the reach of Monday.  In the Personal Restraint Petition of Gentry, the Court ruled that the burden-shifting framework articulated in Monday does not apply retroactively to collateral attacks on criminal convictions.


Continue Reading Wash. S. Ct.: Monday Is Not A Retroactive, “Watershed” Rule Of Criminal Procedure

Schroeder v. Wieghall

When Jaryd Schroeder was nine-years old, he sought treatment from Dr. Steven Weighall and Columbia Basin Imaging.  During this treatment, he received an MRI, which Weighall reviewed and concluded was normal.  Nearly eight years later, at the age of 17, Schroeder underwent another MRI.  This MRI revealed that Schroeder suffered from an Arnold Chiari Type I Malformation.  The radiologist reviewing the second MRI concluded that the condition had been present to the same extent at the time of Schroeder’s first MRI.

Subsequently, the day before his 19th birthday, Schroeder filed a medical malpractice action against Weighall, Columbia Basin Imaging, PC, and a third party (who was dismissed by stipulation).  In response, Weighall argued that the action was time barred by the applicable statute of limitations and subject to the minority-tolling exemption codified at RCW 4.16.190(2).  The trial court agreed with Weighall and dismissed Schroeder’s action.  Schroeder then appealed directly to the Washington Supreme Court, arguing that RCW 4.16.190(2) violated article I, section 10 and article I, section 12 of the Washington State Constitution.

The Washington Supreme Court reversed.Continue Reading Toll This: Wash. S. Ct. Holds Tolling Exemption In Med Mal Cases Unconstitutional

In State v. Liu, a 5-4 majority on the Washington Suprme Court declared the the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not require that DNA tests or other hard to decipher scientific tests be presented in court by the technician who conducted the test.  These tests are not inculpatory because a juror would not understand how the data bears on the guilt or innocence of the defendant without the testimony of an expert witness.  Therefore these complicated reports are not “witness[es] against” the defendant and need not be available for confrontation by the defendant.  While the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) might suggest otherwise, the Washington Court determined that the five Justice majority who signed that opinion was not really a majority because Justice Thomas also wrote an idiosyncratic concurrence. The Washington Court started counting five Supreme Court Justice signatures, but stopped at four.
Continue Reading Washington Court Starts to Count to Five, Stops at Four

The Washington Supreme Court granted review in the followoing four cases at its December 10 conference:

State v. Russell, No. 89253-9

Issue:

1.  A nonconsensual, warrantless, protective frisk is permitted only when a frisking officer has an objectively reasonable belief, based on specific and articulable facts, that a suspect is armed and presently dangerous. Was

Last week the Washington Supreme Court extended a life preserver to plaintiffs who brought med mal claims against public hospitals between July 1, 2010 and December 27, 2012 without giving the hospitals 90-days presuit notice. The Court withdrew its earlier opinions in McDevitt v. Harborview and clarified that its ruling upholding the presuit notice requirement as to public hospitals would apply only prospectively. These substantive points aside, this decision also provides helpful guidance on two matters to judges and practitioners alike: (1) be precise about the scope of the holding, rule of law announced, or relief requested; and (2) don’t give up on motions for reconsideration just because they are rarely granted. More after the jump.
Continue Reading Public Hospital Med Mal Plaintiffs from the Last Three Years Can Breathe Easy

In State v. Monfort, a six justice majority of the Washington Supreme Court emphasized that prosecutors need only make a “subjective determination” about whether a defendant should be executed before filing the notice required to seek the death penalty at trial.  The Supreme Court criticized a trial court for “going beyond the question of whether the county prosecutor had his reasons” and striking a death penalty notice on the basis that the prosecutor’s investigation was inadequate.  Three justices concurred, agreeing that the death penalty notice should be reinstated, but argued that prosecutors must have an objectively reasonable basis for seeking the death penalty.


Continue Reading Washington Supreme Court Holds That Prosecutors May Seek The Death Penalty Without An Objectively Reasonable Basis For The Decision

The Washington Supreme Court approved of community mitigation projects funded by King County and located in Snohomish County to offset the impact of a wastewater plant that King County built in Snohomish County.  The Court largely approved all trial court rulings that the community mitigation expenses were part of the project cost and reversed the sole trial court ruling that a King County expense was unrelated to the sewage treatment goals.
Continue Reading Washington Supreme Court Approves Community Mitigation Component of Wastewater Treatment Plant

Yesterday the Washington Supreme Court recognized that the governor enjoys a qualified executive communications privilege.  In Freedom Foundation v. Gregoire, the Court held that executive privilege is necessary to facilitate candid advice to the governor and is therefore inherent in the state constitutional principle of separation of powers.  Thus, the executive privilege functions as a constitutional exemption from the disclosure requirements of Washington’s Public Records Act (PRA).  Drawing on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Nixon (which required the production of secret audio recordings that precipitated President Nixon’s resignation), the Court ruled that the privilege is presumed upon invocation and can be overcome only by a showing particularized need to access withheld documents.
Continue Reading Washington Supreme Court Recognizes Executive Privilege