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In re Cross [Wash. Sup. Ct. No. 79761-7]

The Washington Supreme Court unanimously held in this opinion that a capital sentence can be predicated on an Alford plea.  The court explained that the “advantage” of entering an Alford plea in a capital case is to preserve the ability to argue in the penalty phase that the defendant’s actions were not premeditated.  But if entering an Alford plea does not allow a criminal defendant to avoid the death penalty, this so-called “advantage” hardly seems worthwhile.  Assuming defense attorneys agree with this assessment, Alford pleas may be both inadvisable and obsolete in capital cases.

Dayva Cross pleaded guilty to killing his wife and two of her daughters in 2001.  When Cross pled guilty, he did so by way of an Alford plea.  In such a plea, the accused technically does not acknowledge guilt but concedes that there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction.  A trial court judge can accept an Alford plea only if it is made voluntarily, competently, and with an understanding of the charge and the consequences of the plea and if the judge is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.

Critical to the Supreme Court’s analysis here, the trial court judge and the prosecutor painstakingly walked Cross through the elements of the crimes of which he was charged, his potential defenses, the rights he was relinquishing, and the punishment he faced.  The trial transcript showed that there was substantial evidence from which a jury could find premeditation and a common scheme and design.  The decision to plead guilty was tactical:  it preserved Cross’s ability to challenge these elements in the penalty phase.
Continue Reading Washington Supreme Court Holds Alford Plea Will Support a Death Penalty Verdict

In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of Benjamin B. Brockie, No. 86241-9 (Sept. 26, 2013) (en banc)

Benjamin Brockie was charged by information for, among other things, first degree robbery.  Brockie’s charging information indicated that “in the commission of an immediate flight therefrom, the defendant displayed what appeared to be a firearm or other deadly weapon.”  (emphasis added).  Critically, the charging information did not provide for the alternative means of committing first degree robbery–being armed with a deadly weapon.  The jury instructions, however, did include this alternative charge.  After Brockie’s trial, a jury convicted Brockie of, among other things two counts of first degree robbery.  In response to these convictions and his subsequent sentencing, Brockie filed a pro se motion to vacate his judgment and sentence.  Brockie’s motion argued that his conviction should be vacated because the jury was improperly instructed on the alternative means of committing first degree robbery, which was not contained in the charging information.  The superior court where Brockie filed his motion considered it a personal restraint petition–a form of collateral attack–and transferred the motion to the Court of Appeals.  The Court of Appeals then transferred the motion to the Washington Supreme Court.
Continue Reading No Prejudice Where Jury Received Charging Instructions Not Included in Original Charging Information

In Freeman v. State, the Washington Supreme Court rejected an attempt to block the lease of the two center lanes on I-90 to Sound Transit for light rail use. In so ruling, the Court held that WSDOT may lease highways financed with MVF monies where a plan exists to reimburse the MVF. It further held that WSDOT may enter into contracts to transfer highway property based on a contingent determination that such highway property will not be needed in the future.
Continue Reading I-90 Light Rail: Washington Supreme Court Says ‘All Aboard’

In State v. Lynch, the Washington State Supreme Court confirmed that a trial court’s inclusion of an affirmative defense instruction upon an unwilling defendant violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights in criminal prosecutions.
Continue Reading State Supreme Court Further Clarifies Distinction Between Casting Doubt on Elements of Charged Crimes and Affirmative Defenses

The Washington Supreme Court held in In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of Haghighi that its 2009 decision State v. Winterstein, which invalidated the “inevitable discovery doctrine,” does not apply retroactively to old convictions. The Court then held that the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim was untimely and, as such, would not be addressed.
Continue Reading The Washington Supreme Court Embraces Teague v. Lane to Find Its Decision Against the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Is Not Retroactive

In Hill v. Garda CL NW, Inc., the Washington Supreme Court reiterated that courts have the power and obligation to resolve dsputes going to the validity of arbitration agreements, unless an arbitration agreement clearly and unmistakably provides otherwise. Unconscionability is one such dispute, and the Court ruled that an arbitration agreement severely limiting the rights of employees was unconscionable.

Background:Continue Reading Washington Supreme Court Clarifies that Courts Must Resolve Disputes that go to the Validity of an Arbitration Agreement (e.g., Unconscionability) before Compelling Arbitration

In King County Public Hospital District No. 2 v. Wash. State Dep’t of Health, the Washington State Supreme Court recognized that administrative law judges have broad discretion to admit evidence in challenges to agency actions. Further, administrative law judges’ decisions on underlying agency actions are reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard, and the record supported the administrative law judge’s decision here that the Department of Health’s action was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

Background:Continue Reading Supreme Court Recognizes Broad Discretion of Administrative Law Judges to Admit Evidence, Even if Inconsistent with Past Agency Position

In State v. McEnroe, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that prosecutors are not prohibited by statute from considering the evidence of guilt in deciding whether to seek the death penalty. Prosecutors must consider mitigating factors, and they also have discretion to consider other factors, including the strength of the evidence. Such consideration, the Court explained, does not violate principles of equal protection so long as prosecutors make an individualized determination.
Continue Reading Prosecutors May Consider the Strength of Evidence of Guilt in Deciding Whether to Seek the Death Penalty

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Welcome to the Stoel Rives Appellate Law blog, dedicated to providing those in appellate law practices regular updates on significant decisions from courts of appeal within our regions of practice. It is our goal to build out this blog to be a handy resource for both keeping up to date on new decisions and quickly locating information about past decisions.