Washington Supreme Court

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In State v. Russell, a unanimous Supreme Court found that police officers who stop and frisk people under the “Terry stop” principle can only look for weapons and not fish for evidence of other crimes.  The Court also ruled that an individual does not give consent to a police search by “appear[ing] not to have a problem” with it – instead the officer must ensure the consent is voluntary and that the individual knows he or she can refuse to give consent.

Here, a cop stopped and frisked an individual, found a small box that could not contain a gun and opened it anyway. The cop found a syringe filled with methamphetamine.  The Supreme Court held that the syringe could not be admitted into evidence against the defendant because a Terry stop only allows protective frisks for weapons and does not justify opening containers to see what is inside them.  The Supreme Court also rejected the alternative argument that the defendant consented to the search by appearing not to have a problem with the frisk and observed that the State failed to establish that the officer gave Miranda warnings or otherwise advised him that he could refuse consent.

Police officers in Washington have been put on notice that they do not have a free hand in seeking evidence through stop and frisk tactics.  They must limit themselves to performing a safety search for weapons unless they get either true consent for a more intrusive search or a warrant.Continue Reading Washington Supreme Court Limits “Stop and Frisk”

In Expedia, Inc. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., the Washington Supreme Court unanimously held that insurers that promise to defend an insured party from lawsuits must pay for the cost of defense as soon as the duty is triggered, regardless of whether the insurer has a defense that might ultimately relieve it of this duty.   An insured party is therefore entitled to payment by the insurance company of the cost of defending lawsuits from the time the duty to defend is triggered until a court declares that the insurance company has no duty to defend.


Continue Reading In Washington, Insurers Must Defend Until They Are Excused

Article by Manmeet Dhami, Summer Associate and law student at University of Washington School of Law

[Learn more about Stoel Rives’ summer program here]

According to a recent Washington Supreme Court decision, providing false information to a Sound Transit fare enforcement officer (FEO) is not punishable under Washington law. Typically, making a false or misleading statement to a public servant is considered a misdemeanor.  However, in State of Washington v. K.L.B., the Washington Supreme Court found that individuals cannot be held liable for false statements made to an FEO because FEOs are not public servants.


Continue Reading Lying Isn’t Nice, But It’s Not Necessarily a Crime

By Sook Kim

In Gomez v. Sauerwein, the Washington Supreme Court held that a medical negligence claim for misdiagnosis and a failure to obtain informed consent claim are mutually exclusive.  Justice Steven Gonzalez, joined by three other justices, concurred in the result but disagreed with the majority’s reasoning on this issue, arguing while alternative theories were inappropriate under the facts of this case, the claims are not always mutually exclusive.Continue Reading Wash. S. Ct.: Medical Misdiagnosis Claims Separate and Distinct from Informed Consent Claims

By Hunter Ferguson and Manmeet Dhami

When considering a parenting plan, trial courts start from the premise that it is ordinarily in a child’s best interest to alter the existing pattern of parent-child interactions only to the extent necessary because of the parents’ changed relationship from physical, mental, or emotional harm.  But, as is the case with most general rules and standards, there are exceptions.  Under section .191(3) of the Parenting Act of 1987, trial courts may impose limitations on parental contact to guard against “adverse effects” if they find the presence of certain enumerated factors or under a catchall provision, subsection (g).  In In re Marriage of Chandola, the Washington Supreme Court clarified that in order to impose limitations under the catchall provision, a trial court must find the presence of factors similar in severity to those enumerated in the statute – i.e., factors that present a relatively severe risk of physical, mental, or emotional harm to a child.Continue Reading Wash. S. Ct. Clarifies Standard for Imposing Limitations on Parenting Plans

In Fisher Broadcasting v. Seattle, five Supreme Court justices held that the Seattle Police Department  violated the Public Records Act (PRA) when it denied  a KOMO TV reporter’s request for “a list of any and all digital in-car video/audio recordings that have been tagged for retention” by officers, including “officer’s name, badge number, date, time and location when the video was tagged for retention.”    The SPD denied the request because it was “unable to query the system in the way [the KOMO reporter] requested.”   However, the SPD later granted a similar request by another party and produced logs of retained dashboard documents in their original Microsoft SQL Server format.
Continue Reading Police Dash Cam Footage Subject to Public Disclosure (with exceptions)

In State v. Coley, the Washington Supreme Court ruled 7-2 that defendants bear the burden of proof for establishing they are incompetent to stand trial after they complete therapeutic treatment designed to restore them to competency.  While the right to be competent during a criminal trial is grounded in the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Court primarily looked to Washington’s codification of that right at RCW Chapter 10.77.  The Court found that legislature intended that the burden of proof fall on the party seeking to establish incompetency at all stages of trial, even after a prior finding of incompetency.
Continue Reading You’re All Better Now: Courts Will Presume Defendants Are Competent After Treatment

In Campbell v. State of Washington Employment Security Department, a unanimous Washington Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Department of Employment Security (Department) that a school teacher who quit his job in June 2010, to accompany his wife in February 2011 to Finland on her Fulbright grant, did not qualify for unemployment benefits under RCW 50.20.050(2)(b)(iii) because it was unreasonable to quit seven months before the planned relocation.
Continue Reading Don’t Quit Too Soon

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Welcome to the Stoel Rives Appellate Law blog, dedicated to providing those in appellate law practices regular updates on significant decisions from courts of appeal within our regions of practice. It is our goal to build out this blog to be a handy resource for both keeping up to date on new decisions and quickly locating information about past decisions.