At its November 5, 2013 conference, the Washington Supreme Court granted review in four cases summarized below.

State v. Lamar
Supreme Court No. 89060-9
Court of Appeals No. 68148-6-I

Issue: Whether the defendant was entitled to a new trial after the court failed to instruct a jury reconstituted with an alternative juror that it must disregard all deliberations by the original jury and start again.

State v. Paige-Colter
Supreme Court Case No. 89109-5
Court of Appeals No. 42904-7-II
Consolidated with State v. Blazina, Supreme Court Case No. 89028-5

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in imposing legal financial obligations (fees and assessments) on the defendant without evidence in the record regarding the defendant’s ability to pay.

State v. Olsen                                                                                                                                    Supreme Court No. 89134-6                                                                                                Court of Appeals No. 42135-6-II

Issue: Washington courts may base offender scores on factually comparable foreign offenses – offenses that would violate comparable Washington statutes. By pleading “no contest” to the California crime of “terrorist threats,” Olsen admitted threatening to cause “death” from which the threatened person was “reasonably in sustained fear” for “her own safety.” Does that plea satisfy the element of the Washington “threat to kill” felony that the recipient reasonably believe the threat to kill would be carried out?


State v. Medina                                                                                                                 Supreme Court No. 89147-8                                                                                                    Court of Appelas No. 67757-8-I, consol. w/ 67758-6-I

Issue:  An offender shall receive credit for presentence partial confinement time in home detention or on a work crew, if the confinement was solely for the crime charged and for a “substantial portion of each day” (at least eight hours per day by statute).  Was Medina entitled to receive credit for participation in an alternative program that temporally could not have applied to his crime of conviction and required participation for only six hours per day?